And Egypt faces its first man-made Nile flood thanks to Ethiopia’s GERD

Egyptians slept on Thursday, wondering what would happen after reading the Egyptian prime minister Mostafa Madbouly that the Nile floodwaters are expected to inundate riverbank areas and informal housing in Monufia and Behaira during October, as the River Nile water discharge is forecast to exceed average seasonal levels.

Then they woke up on Friday only to find that there were warnings issued to 15 governorates.

The warning was to expect Nile floodwaters are expected to inundate riverbank areas in Luxor, Qena, Sohag, Assuit, Al-Minya, Bani Suef, Giza, Cairo, Qalyubia, Monufia, Sharkia, Gharbia, Kafr El-Sheikh, Dahaqliya and Damietta.

Dalhamo village after the man-made flood 
by Doaa Adel 

Then videos taken by local journalists showing the River Nile flooding the riverbank areas and islands in Monufia began to go viral, especially from Dalhamo village, part of Ashmoun district, where Citizens lost their houses and cattle.

The journalists were on boats filming the citizens.

The citizens from the other bank filmed too that flood.

According to local journalists and citizens , not less than 1,000 fedans were flooded.

Unfortunately, they are classified by the government as encroachers and squatters who occupied that land illegally.

Yet, when you listen to those people, you will find them saying that they have been there for 25 years !!

For many, it was surprising, if not a shock, that a Nile flood, a word that seemed of the past in Egypt thanks to the Aswan High Dam, is going to possibly submerge the river Nile’s bank in none other than Mounfia and Behaira in the North Delta.

Dalhamo village after the man-made flood by Doaa Adel 

Whether floods or droughts, the Aswan High Dam, despite its flaws, protected us.

When I searched online, I found out that Monufia has historically faced some of the toughest challenges with Nile flooding due to its geographic position in one of the lowest-lying areas of the central Nile Delta.

Dalhamo village after the man-made flood by Doaa Adel 

The governorate lies between the Rosetta and Damietta branches, where floodwaters would often collect naturally before the construction of the Aswan High Dam. 

Its dense irrigation network, while vital for agriculture, made drainage more difficult and increased the risk of waterlogging during high floods.

As a result, Monufia’s farmers developed a long tradition of careful water management, reinforcing canals and drainage systems more frequently than other Delta regions to protect their fertile but flood-prone land.

Dalhamo village after the man-made flood by Doaa Adel 

Now this is what the Ministry of Irrigation in Egypt said on Friday.

According to its official statement, the Ministry is closely monitoring this year’s Nile flood caused by none other than the reckless unilateral actions taken by Ethiopia in operating the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which the Ministry described as “illegal and in violation of international law.”

These practices lack transparency, pose a direct threat to downstream nations, and contradict Ethiopia’s repeated claims of causing no harm, it added.

Now, what happened this year and caused the Nile floods in Sudan and Egypt?

The Ministry explains the matter as follows: The Nile waters originate from three tributaries—the White Nile, Blue Nile, and Atbara. This year’s flood levels at the sources are about 25% higher than average, though lower than last year’s high flood.

Instead of gradually storing water from July to October and releasing it steadily for power generation via GERD, Ethiopia suddenly reduced releases in early September from 280 million m³/day to just 110 million m³/day, aiming to rapidly raise the water level to 640m.

On 9 September, Ethiopia staged an “opening ceremony” of the GERD, after which it abruptly released massive discharges:

• 485 million m³ on 10 September
• 780 million m³ on 27 September
• 380 million m³ on 30 September

Altogether, around 2 billion m³ of stored water were suddenly released, creating an artificial flood.
The sudden surge, combined with irregular rainfall and high White Nile flows, led to flooding of agricultural lands and villages in Sudan.

Residents attempt to retrieve their belongings by boat
after the Nile River flooded their village in Bahri city, north of Khartoum, Sudan
earlier this month by Mohamed Khidir for Xinhua 

The Sudanese Rosieres Dam could only store a small portion, forcing most of the water to be released downstream.

The Ministry stressed that this “artificial flood” proves Ethiopia’s irresponsible and politically motivated management of the GERD, prioritising publicity over safety.

Egypt has long warned that storing 74 billion m³ without a binding legal agreement governing the dam’s filling and long-term operations poses a permanent risk to downstream states.

The statement read that Egypt manages its water resources dynamically, adjusting releases seasonally, and has the High Dam and Toshka spillway as safeguards.

On 7 September 2025, all governors were alerted to warn citizens farming or building illegally on riverbanks (floodplain land) to take precautions.

The Ministry clarified that recent flooding in some areas was limited to Nile floodplain lands, not governorates, and losses were linked to illegal encroachments.

It also affirmed that the High Dam remains the main guarantee for Egypt’s protection against unpredictable Nile fluctuations, and that water resources are being managed with high efficiency to safeguard lives, property, and agricultural needs.

Needless to say, there are still expert voices in Egypt that see the Ministry did not do enough and miscalculated the damages aside from the political accountability.

Besides accusing Ethiopia of standing behind the man-made floods, Egyptian irrigation expert Dr Nader Nour El-Din also attributed the recent flooding in parts of Egypt to miscalculation in water management rather than natural causes

He argued that Ethiopia’s late release of Blue Nile floodwaters this year was predictable, yet Egypt’s Lake Nasser was already near full capacity before the surge arrived, forcing officials to open several gates of the High Dam suddenly to make space for the incoming water.

According to Dr Nader, this abrupt discharge raised river levels sharply and flooded low-lying farmlands and river islands, just like in Mounfia, even though the released water was technically regulated, not uncontrolled floodwater.

He questioned why the Toshka Spillway, designed to handle such excess, was not activated earlier in smaller, gradual releases, noting that the spillway is fully functional and had already discharged large volumes into the Toshka area — damaging some agricultural lands.

The irrigation professor outlined the sequence of events behind the crisis: Ethiopia stored almost all of this year’s floodwaters and released no significant amounts until September 10. Then, between September 26 and October 1, it opened several GERD gates, releasing around three-quarters of a billion cubic meters per day for six days — a total of 5.6 billion cubic meters — before reducing the flow to 450 million cubic meters daily for another six days.

He noted that such timing placed sudden pressure on downstream systems and that Egypt’s late response magnified the flooding risk.

Dalhamo village after the man-made flood 
by Doaa Adel 

Recalling the 1988 high flood, which was handled efficiently without public impact, Dr Nour El-Din suggested that today’s situation reflects a mix of poor coordination, delayed decision-making, and absence of proactive management, not only Ethiopia’s actions.

He called on the Ministry of Irrigation to provide transparent explanations and technical data to clarify how the dam’s gates, Lake Nasser levels, and Toshka operations were managed during the event — and whether earlier action could have prevented flooding in the first place.

For the record, the Ministry of Irrigation did release a graph with technical data. 

Now, while I am not an expert like Dr Nour El-Din, there are some facts I think we should consider when we speak about the miscalculations of the Ministry of Irrigation.

As per the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan established the PJTC was established to oversee technical cooperation and water management, including the supervision of the extensive hydrological network and operating gauging stations.

Gauging stations play a vital role in managing the Nile’s water system. They are used to forecast floods and droughts, regulate dam releases, and plan irrigation schedules. These stations also track how much water flows from Sudan to Egypt, such as when Ethiopia opens the GERD gates.

In simple terms, a gauging station functions like the Nile’s speedometer and fuel gauge, showing how fast and how full the river is at critical points along its course.

I couldn’t find an exact recent count of Egyptian gauging stations in Sudan, but according to an irrigation report from 1982, there were about 38 stations across several regions — including Bahr el Ghazal, the Sobat River, Bahr el Zaraf, the Main Nile, the Atbara and Blue Nile rivers, and Khashm el Girba.

By the 2000s, estimates suggested that the total had grown to around 100 stations, including those jointly managed with Sudanese authorities.

Egypt has long maintained a permanent Irrigation Ministry Mission in Sudan, responsible for operating these stations and sending real-time reports to Cairo. 

A quick search even shows that an Irrigation Museum once existed at the General Inspection Building of the Central Directorate of Egyptian Irrigation in Khartoum.

However, the mission was forced to leave Sudan following the outbreak of war between the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). 

The gauging stations have reportedly been closed since April 2023, and the mission has not yet returned due to the ongoing security situation. 

After the RSF captured Egyptian soldiers and officers in Meroe, it became clear that Egyptian personnel were at risk, especially since Cairo sided with the Sudanese state and army. I assume that the RSF mercenaries looted and destroyed stations 

While satellite imagery is valuable for observing water surfaces and tracking changes along the Nile, it cannot replace the precision of gauging stations. 

A satellite image can show that the river looks fuller or wider, but only a gauging station can measure exactly how much water is flowing and how fast. These readings are what allow engineers to predict the size of an incoming flood, regulate dam releases, and manage irrigation accurately. In short, satellites can see the water, but gauging stations can read it.

I do not doubt that if our irrigation mission had been in Sudan, things would have been different, and the Ministry would have had better calculations and management for the whole crisis.

In a way, this year’s man-made flood felt like yet another disaster indirectly caused by the RSF.

Now, I remind you that Egypt and Sudan’s core demand regarding GERD has been the establishment of a legally binding agreement governing the dam’s filling and long-term operation to safeguard their water security.  

Upstream countries have also called for a binding framework regulating the dam’s long-term management, particularly during periods of drought. 

Ethiopia is happy with the chaos in Sudan, but we are still here.

Egypt has rejected proposals for non-binding guidelines, insisting on concrete assurances that the GERD will not inflict “serious harm” on its water supply, whereas Ethiopia explicitly says it wants a new agreement over Egypt and Sudan's water shares, rejecting the old  

Given that the Nile provides over 90% of its freshwater, we as Egyptians view the issue as an existential threat.

Now, after what happened last week, we must ask many questions and, most importantly, what's next?