The Damned Dam : The truth and myth of the River Nile’s so-called colonial era treaties “Episode 1 : The road to 1902 treaty”

Ethiopia has fired back at Egypt’s latest statement, warning of its unilateral actions concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

The Ethiopian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on Wednesday using the same old accusations against Egypt of standing behind unrest in the Horn of Africa.

It slammed Egypt’s demands to respect the historical old treaties, describing them as “colonial era mentality” as it used big words like “Pan-Africanism” because Egypt is Africa’s white man, as Egyptians are not black enough.

The thing is that this Ethiopian statement, like the rest of old Ethiopian statements, plays on certain sentiments in Africa to win hearts and minds in a wicked way, twisting facts and history.

Unfortunately, the Egyptian government does not use the same playbook Ethiopia is using. It actually uses international laws in a lawless world.

This post aims to set the facts and history straight regarding colonial-era treaties.

Among the main Egyptian demands per the international laws organizing the rivers across borders is Ethiopia’s recognition and respect as an upstream country to the historical Nile River Water Shares of both Egypt and Sudan as downstream countries based on the historical Nile Water treaties, especially 1902,1929 and 1951, which Ethiopia labels as colonial treaties”

Interestingly, Ethiopia’s modern diplomacy often relies on a powerful narrative — that it is the only African country never to have been colonised.

It’s repeated in schools, documentaries, and political speeches, framing Ethiopia as the proud exception to Africa’s colonial story — the continent’s “real-world Wakanda.” Yet the deeper one digs, the more contradictions begin to appear.

What I cannot understand is how the current regime insists it was forced into accepting “colonial-era treaties” when, by its own celebrated narrative, Ethiopia was never colonized.

If Ethiopia was truly the unbroken, unconquered “Wakanda” during the great scramble for Africa, then the story becomes even more complicated — because the country was invaded twice, and in neither instance did the Ethiopian state sign anything related to the Nile, starting with the 1902 treaty.

But we can’t start with the 1902 treaty without going back in time to 1889.

In 1889, the Kingdom of Itay and the Ethiopian Empire signed the Treaty of Wuchale after the Italian occupation of Eritrea. It was signed in the small Ethiopian town of Wuchale, from which the treaty got its name.

Eritrea at that time could be divided into two parts: the Eritrean highlands, which were under Ethiopian control then

For centuries, the Eritrean highlands were politically linked to the Ethiopian Empire, though the level of direct control varied greatly with the strength of the central government.

Needless to say, if Ethiopia claims that Eritrea — or at least the Eritrean highlands — was historically Ethiopian territory, then that alone shatters the “Wakanda of Africa” narrative.

By that logic, an Ethiopian territory was in fact invaded and colonized for decades.

The second part of Eritrea was the low-lying coastal areas, and the Red Sea ports were historically dominated by the Ottoman Empire since the 16^th century, and then by the mid-19th century, the Ottomans gave the ports to the Khedivate of Egypt during that short attempt by Khedive Ismail to expand his Equatorial directorate and to control the Nile river upstream.

After the British invasion of Egypt in 1882, Italy took over the Egyptian-controlled ports.

In the Treaty of Wuchale, Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia—in exchange for crucial military and financial aid, and in the immediate aftermath of the death of his rival, Emperor Yohannes IV—effectively recognized Italy’s sovereign claim over the territories that were consolidated into the Colony of Eritrea. 

Menelik II

But the treaty came with a colonial trap. Article 17 of the agreement differed sharply between the Amharic and Italian versions.

In Amharic, Article 17 stated that Menelik II “can use” the services of the King of Italy in foreign affairs.

In the Italian version, however, the same article stated that Menelik II must rely on the Italian government for all foreign relations — effectively turning Ethiopia into an Italian protectorate without a single Italian soldier ever setting foot on the ground.

Roughly eight months after signing the treaty, Menelik II realized the price he had paid when he wrote to European monarchs, only to receive replies informing him that they dealt with Italy as Ethiopia’s representative because Ethiopia was considered an Italian protectorate.

The treaty became a stark lesson for Menelik II, demonstrating how colonial powers deployed linguistic manipulation and mistranslation against nations of the Global South.

Ironically, he would later become highly skilled in this very diplomatic tactic himself, as you will see.

In 1891, Italy signed a secret treaty with the UK, commonly known as the Anglo-Italian Protocols, that defined their spheres of influence in East Africa, or rather, defining their colonial turfs.

The protocols defined where Italy's claimed protectorate (Ethiopia and Eritrea) ended and where Britain's existing claims (Sudan, British Somaliland) began.

Already, Italy in the protocol represented Ethiopia in the talks according to the Wuchale treaty.

Article III of the protocol stipulated the following, and here I am using the original English text: The Italian government engages not to construct on the Atbara River, in view of irrigation, any work which might sensibly modify its flow into the Nile.

Officially, Legally and geographically, the clause applied only to the portion of the Atbara River flowing through Italy’s established colony of Eritrea — not to the Ethiopian highlands.

However, in light of the Wuchale Treaty and Italy’s subsequent claim that Ethiopia was its protectorate, it is possible that Article III was also meant as a preemptive restriction on any future activities along the Blue Nile or the Atbara as a whole.

Already Article III of the 1891 Anglo-Italian Protocol, therefore, stands as the first formal international agreement of the modern era whose explicit purpose was to regulate the use of Nile waters.

It is also the first river transboundary agreement, and despite being signed by two colonial powers that care less for the peoples of the Nile river basin, the language used in it is an early example of a principle that would later become a cornerstone of modern international water law: “The No-harm” rule.

The article can be formalised now as "Obligation Not to Cause Significant Harm,"

In 1895, Italy invaded Ethiopia in hopes of expanding its African territory and declared it as its protectorate in reality, but the Ethiopian army decisively defeated the Italians at the Battle of Adwa in 1896.

Following that defeat, Italy signed a treaty recognizing Ethiopia’s full and absolute independence.

In 1902, Emperor Menelik II — as the ruler of an internationally recognized, independent state — signed the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty with Great Britain (acting on behalf of Sudan).

The treaty’s main purposes were to define the Ethiopia–Sudan frontier and to secure the uninterrupted flow of the Nile.

Despite the territory being legally the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the Khedivate of Egypt was not a direct signatory to the 1902 treaty. Britain claimed the right to negotiate on behalf of the Sudan Condominium.

Under the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, Sudan was supposedly ruled jointly by the United Kingdom and the Khedivate of Egypt. On paper, it was a shared administration; in reality, it functioned as a de facto Anglo-Sudan, governed by a British Governor-General.

Meanwhile, Egypt itself was still an Ottoman Khedivate under effective British military occupation — a “veiled protectorate” following the British invasion of 1882.

So, by 1902, both Egypt and Sudan were under colonial control, while Ethiopia stood as an independent state recognized by Britain itself.

Signed on May 15, 1902, by Emperor Menelik II himself and the British representative Lt. Col. John Lane Harrington, the treaty consisted of five articles, most importantly, the first and the third articles.

While its main purpose was border demarcation, the treaty also included provisions for a railway line between Sudan and Kenya "British colonies" and a commercial station near Gambela.

The first article formalized the border between its colony (Sudan) and the independent Empire of Ethiopia, but it would not be a true British colonial era treaty if it were not without a trap for both Sudan and Ethiopia.

The trap was that key sections of the border areas between Sudan and Ethiopia, including Al-Fashaga, were never fully demarcated on the ground, creating what is known as the Gwynn Line (named after the British officer involved).

The Gwynn line places Al-Fashaga within Sudan, but ethnic Ethiopian farmers (mostly from the Amhara region) have historically settled and cultivated the fertile land there for decades, paying taxes to the Ethiopian side.

Till this day, a fight persists between Sudan and Ethiopia over those border points, especially Al-Fashaga. Sudanese forces seized control of the area from Ethiopia in 2020, shortly preceding Sudan's internal conflict between the two generals in 2023.

To the third article related to the Nile River, which Ethiopia weaponised against both Egypt and Sudan.

Generally, the third article stipulated that Ethiopia agreed not to build any work that would obstruct the flow of the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat River without the consent of the British government in Sudan, but that’s in the English version and the Italian version.

The treaty was officially translated into English, Amharic and Italian.

The English version of the 1902 Treaty states that Emperor Menelik II agreed not to construct any works across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat that would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile, except in agreement with the British Government.

Yet, the Amharic translation, drafted by the Ethiopian Imperial court's scribes, implies that the emperor only agreed not to stop (totally block) the flow.

This critical difference meant the Amharic text did not explicitly forbid Ethiopia from using the water or building dams for its own development purposes.

Menelik II learned the lesson well from the Treaty of Wuchale and the deception of the Italians.

Ethiopia has historically argued that the Amharic version is the binding one, as Menelik signed it, believing it prevented only "total blockage." 

This forms the legal foundation for Ethiopia's current position that the treaty was never intended to prevent it from utilizing its own water resources for projects like the GERD.

Ironically, despite the treaty stating that the Italian text was equally authoritative, the entire subsequent legal and diplomatic fight has focused exclusively on reconciling the contradictory English and Amharic versions.

The last paragraph of the English version of the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty explicitly stated: "in triplicate, written in the Italian, English and Amharic languages identically, all texts being official." 

This means that, legally, the Italian text is equally authoritative to the English and Amharic versions; it is not merely a translation but a binding version of the contract.

This legal point is crucial because, unlike Egypt and Sudan, which were under British control at the time, Ethiopia was an independent nation when it signed with the UK. The Ethiopian Imperial court successfully manipulated the Amharic text to serve its sovereign interests, having learned bitter lessons from the 1889 Treaty of Wuchale.

Consequently, the Nile River treaties of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were unique: despite being signed by the world's greatest power, they were challenged by a legally and diplomatically astute independent nation (Ethiopia).

The secrecy surrounding the 1891 Anglo-Italian Protocols underscores Britain’s risk assessment; the British maintained secrecy most likely because they knew Italy's claim of a protectorate over Ethiopia was weak and that a full conquest would be a difficult and costly mission, given the proven strength of the Ethiopian army and the nature of the country.

The 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty itself, therefore, cannot be viewed as a fully coercive colonial agreement that simply forced Ethiopia into accepting terms against its interests.

On the contrary, Emperor Menelik II was an independent and astute negotiator who used the treaty to his advantage. He secured crucial border demarcation and international recognition from a major power, gaining as much as he conceded.

This context highlights the profound irony of Ethiopia's current position: Ethiopia now rejects Article III of the 1902 Treaty by claiming it was a colonial-era imposition, even though it entered the negotiation as an independent state—the sole independent nation in the region—and deliberately leveraged the agreement (modifying the text in Amharic) to solidify its sovereign status.

Crucially, Ethiopia recognizes to this day the treaty's other articles related to the demarcation of borders, which are a fundamental basis of modern Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, thereby accepting the benefits while rejecting the restrictions in one of the biggest geopolitical ironies of the Nile Basin.

Next episode in this series, we will continue to know more about the 1929 and 1951 treaties inshallah.